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In this brief note, we argue that contrarily to what is still often stated, the Everett many-worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics is not in principle impossible to test. It is actually not more
difficult (but not easier either) to test than most other kinds of multiverse theories. We also remind
why multiverse scenarios can be falsified.
I. THE EVERETT MANY WORLD
INTERPRETATION
This brief article does not contain any fundamentally
new material. It only aims at contradicting a naive
–and in our view incorrect– belief that seems to be
dominant in the physics community: the unfalsifiability
of the Everett ”many-worlds” interpretation of quantum
mechanics. Although the Everett interpretation is taken
more and more seriously, the reason for this choice
seems to be mostly aesthetic as most articles about the
many-worlds view mention its fundamental untestability.
At the intuitive level, the Everett interpretation of
quantum mechanics (see [1, 2] for historical articles)
states that all possible alternate histories of a quantum
system are actually real. Each of them takes place in
a different universe, there is no collapse of the wave
function. All that could have happened in our past but
didn’t happen here, did indeed happen in another world.
All that can happen in the future will happen in different
universes. Every possible quantum outcome is real in one
universe. How strange it might look, this vision is now
considered as one of the mainstream interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Its obvious advantage is somehow
to take quantum mechanics ”literally” without adding
by hands a non-unitary evolution mysteriously triggered
by the measurement process.
Slightly more rigorously, the Everett interpretation
could be said to rely on two hypothesis. Firstly that
the wavefunction has an observer-independent objective
existence and actually is the fundamental object. For
a non-relativistic N-particle system the wavefunction
is a complex-valued field in a 3N dimensional space.
Secondly that the wavefunction obeys the standard
linear deterministic wave equations at all times. The
observer plays no special role in the theory and, conse-
quently, there is no collapse of the wavefunction. For
non-relativistic systems, the Schro¨dinger wave equation
describes the evolution.
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II. THE MULTIVERSE AND EXPERIMENTS
Apart from the Everett interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, many kinds of ”multiverses” are now discussed
in cosmology. One can cite for example the infinite space
that would arise when k = 0 or k = −1 (if the topology
is simple) and contains infinitely many Hubble volumes,
the interior of charged or rotating black holes if one takes
seriously analytically extended Penrose-Carter diagrams,
the inflationary bubbles possibly filled by different laws
of physics, etc. Different laws of physics can in particular
be obtained by compactification schemes and generalized
magnetic fluxes in string theory or, more generically,
by any kind of theory that has several local minima or
vacua. We will, in the following of this section focus on
such models. In each of the previously given examples,
the word ”universe” has a different meaning depending
on the case.
Are those multiverses testable ? The answer is : in
principle, yes. There are at least two different arguments
in this direction. The first one is to emphasize (see, e.g.,
[3] in particular arguments by M. Tegmark) that the mul-
tiverse is not a hypothesis but a consequence. It would
indeed be an artificial and ad hoc hypothesis. But it ac-
tually appears as an output of theories that can be tested
locally and that are built for completely other purposes,
for example particle physics or quantum gravity. It is
not an input. If those theories were to be falsified, all
their predictions would disappear, including the multi-
verse. The other way round, if those theories were to
be part of our main paradigm it would be inconsistant
to discard the multiverse they produce just because one
does not like the idea. So, basically, the point is that
we should not test the multiverse, but rather the the-
ory that predicts it. And this is certainly in principle
possible. Exactly as one uses general relativity (GR) to
describe the internal structure of black holes even if this
specific prediction cannot be tested, just because we are
confident enough in GR to trust this.
The second argument is more closely related with the
multiverse in itself. There is –in those approaches– a
large (possibly infinite) number of universes. And we see
only a single one. Can something be said about the whole
ensemble ? Obviously yes ! Let us imagine than instead
of billions of particle collisions we were to see only one
at the LHC. Would we have discovered the Higgs ? Of
course not. But would be have been able to disproof a
crazy model of particle physic? Most probably yes. A
single sample contains less information than the full set
but it does contain some information. It makes a statis-
tical test possible, as usual in physics (either for quan-
tum of classical reasons, all confirmations or exclusions
are anyway statistical).To make precise predictions in the
multiverse and compare them with our own universe, it
is necessary but not sufficient to know the shape of the
landscape. It is also necessary to account for a possible
bias in the sample we observe (this is also very common
in science). This precaution might be referred to as the
anthropic principle. Let us make it very clear that there
is absolutely no link at all between this principle (which
is not actually a principle but rather a reminder) and in-
telligent design, anthropocentrism, theology or teleology.
Just the other way round, the point is only to take care
of the fact that as our planet is obviously not at all rep-
resentative of our full universe, our universe might not
be representative of the full multiverse. There is nothing
mysterious or mystic here, this is just a bias that should
be accounted for: we live in a place which is favorable to
complexity, just because we are ourselves complex struc-
ture, of course we do not live in empty space or at the
center of a neutron star. Similarly, our universe might
be more complexity-friendly than most others and when
trying to test the compatibility of a given theory with
our observations we have to take care of that.
Let us assume that a model predicts a billion of
universes, all of them but one being empty. Let us take
a random sample. If this sample is full of stars, one can
conclude that the theory is excluded at a high confidence
level. But if we now consider a random sample selected
from within by an observer and take into account the
selection bias due to the fact that we are ourselves
not made of vacuum, the model will not anymore be
disfavored.
So, basically, when comparing the structure of the
landscape (of solutions of the considered theory) with
the sample universe we live in, the important quantity
is the product of the probability of a given solution Si,
P (Si), by the number of observer N(Si) in this solution.
If one considers a random human being wondering where
he lives, there are more chances that he is Indian rather
than Australian, even though Australia is larger than
India, just because there are more Indian observers.
This has to be accounted for when trying to reconstruct
the landscapes of the Earth from local descriptions. It is
well known that this formulation is obviously too vague
and ill defined. We don’t know how to define properly
an observer in a general enough way. In addition, there
are many severe limits associated with general problems
in constructing a proper and unique measure. These
are, however, mostly technical problems that can, in
principle, be solved. Then, the compatibility between
our world and this observer-weighted probability dis-
tribution over the landscape can be evaluated and the
model excluded or confirmed at a given confidence level.
This view is not sterile. Even if one takes a narrow-
minded non-ontological definition of physics (assumed to
be only useful in making local predictions), this has con-
sequences. As an example, one can consider the status
of the inflationary model, in view of the Planck mission
results. Depending on whether one takes into account
the multiverse –that is a generic prediction of eternal
inflation– or ignore it, the compatibility of the model
with data might change completely (see, e.g., [4]). Actu-
ally, our universe might even be exponentially disfavored
in an inflationary multiverse [5], which is not at all the
case in a single universe.
III. BASIC IDEA FOR TESTING THE
EVERETT HYPOTHESIS
Following [6], we would like to argue that the Everett
interpretation of quantum mechanics can be tested in
the very same way.
The question of testing the Everett vision has been
raised long ago. Three possible ”tests” that we won’t
describe in details here (see [7]) have been considered.
The first one is related with linearity. In principle, be-
cause of linearity, it is possible to detect the presence of
other nearby worlds, through the existence of interfer-
ence effects. This has been pushed forward in [8] where
an observer splits into two copies making different obser-
vations. They remember having made observations but
not the results and can therefore be rejoined coherently
into a single copy. This is very clever but nearly impos-
sible to be made experimentally.
The second one is that many-worlds actually requires
that gravity be quantized, in contrast to other interpre-
tations which are silent about the role of gravity. The
reason is that if gravity was to remain non-quantized,
all the universes that the Everett interpretation predicts
should be easily detectable by their gravitational pres-
ence –they would all share the same background metric
with our co-existing quantum worlds. Of course, gravity
could be quantized and, still, the Everett interpretation
could be wrong.
The third one, related with the first one and still
using linearity (see [9]) is based on reversible quantum
computers. It requires currently beyond of reach artifi-
cial intelligence and reversible nanoelectronics.
What we want to emphasize here, as D. Page somehow
did more than a decade ago, is that in the framework of
quantum cosmology, testing the Everett interpretation
of quantum mechanics is not different from testing any
other multiverse proposal.
In a single universe interpretation of quantum mechan-
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ics, only the relative probability for different universes
matters. There is only one universe, so only the prob-
abilities between different outcomes are important. If
the probability for a x-universe is much higher than
the probability for a y-universe, we should be in the x-
universe, whatever the number of observers it generates.
However, in the Everett vision, all possible universes
do actually exist. So, if the number of observers are
different, say Nx and Ny respectively in the x-universe
and the y-universe, the relevant probabilities are now
the ones weighted by the number of observers. If the
ratio Ny/Nx is higher that P (x)/P (y), the prediction is
now the opposite. We should be in the y-universe. The
point is that the situation is basically the same as in
any multiverse situation. If there in only one World we
should compute probability for this World, if there are
many worlds the observer-weighted probability is the
correct distribution. In principle, observations can select
which one is true.
The methodology is very close to now standard ap-
proaches to testing the multiverse. Instead of just testing
a model the point here is to test two interpretations of
quantum mechanics. As long as the two interpretations
lead to different final probability distributions, which is
the case, the proposal is testable.
IV. DIGRESSION ON WHAT SCIENCE IS
It is often argued in physics articles that ”science
is what Popper says: something that can be falsified,
and we should not step away from that”. First, we
would like to underline that the multiverse is not outside
this definition. It is not a theory, it is part of the
predictions of theories that can in principle be falsified.
As we explained before, many researches are devoted
to the internal structure of black holes in GR. This
is considered as usual science whereas nobody can go
there and come back telling us if that is true. Once
a model, in this exemple GR, is well enough tested
to be part of the dominant paradigm, it is perfectly
legitimate to use it even where it cannot be tested. It
has hopefully never been necessary to check all the pre-
dictions of a theory to consider it as reliable and to use it.
Beyond that, we believe that we should not take
Popper (or, more precisely this caricatural simplification
of Popper’s claims) too seriously. First, because it
is only one epistemology among many others, say,
for example (considering only the the XXth century),
Carnap, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Cavaille`s, Bourdieu,
Feyerabend, Kuhn, Koyre´, Lakatos, Quine, Latour,
Hacking, Merton, etc. All those epistemologies lead to
consistent views on science that are completely different
from the one of Popper whose popularity might just be
due to its simplicity. But every scientist knows that
falsifiability does not work in practice : all theories
have troubles and depending on the situation we might
assume invisible objects (dark matter for exemple) or
a more limited domain of application of the theory to
save it anyway. No serious theory has ever been refuted
by a single experiment. Not to mention that most
new theories were initially believed to be impossible to
test/falsify (remember Auguste Comte believing, just
before the discovery of spectroscopy, that discussing
the composition of stars was not science as no one will
ever be able to go there and analyse them). Popper’s
epistemology comes together with (or is deeply rooted
in) a highly contestable firm belief that science will
solve and has already solved most problems of the
humanity (”today, misery has essentially disappeared
from occidental Europe; excessive social disparity
do not exist anymore”, said he before criticizing ”in-
tellectuals” that do not agree with this obvious remark !).
Anyway, even if Popper was right in describing what
science was –and we don’t believe so–, say in the 1950’s,
why should we take this as a correct definition forever
? In essence, science is a dynamical process. Playing
with the rules if obviously part of the game. Hopefully,
the rules are not the same now as what they were for
Galileo. Science is about deconstruction: nothing can be
taken for granted, everything can –in principle– be re-
vised and changed. If one wants certainty and immuable
rules, one should better consider theology. Of course, we
all expect science to make predictions and to describe
the World(s) more precisely. Everything is for sure not
allowed. But one cannot know what are the correct re-
visions before exploring them and considering the con-
sequences. So, even if the multiverse was –and we don’t
think it is the case– to impose a change of the rules of the
game, we think it would be more dangerous to a priori
forbid the idea than to seriously study the new paradigm
it might generate. All fields get redefined from within.
This is obviously the case in art where contemporary mu-
sical composition, poetical writing and pictorial creation
do not obey the aesthetics as it was defined initially by
Baumgarten. Why wouldn’t this evolution of the rules
be allowed for science which is, probably more than any
other, the cognitive field where changes are essential ?
V. SPECIFIC POSSIBLE TESTS OF THE
EVERETT INTERPRETATION
In [6], the particular example of the Hartle-Hawking
no-boundary proposal was considered as a consistent pro-
posal for a quantum state of the Universe. The Hartle-
Hawking proposal basically does away with the initial
three geometry, i.e. only includes four dimensional ge-
ometries that match onto the final three geometry. The
path integral is interpreted as giving the probability of a
universe with certain properties (i.e. those of the bound-
ary three geometry) being created from essentially noth-
ing. In a S3 minisuperspace approach with a single φ2
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potential scalar field, the no-boundary proposal instan-
ton leads to a set of FLRW universes with various number
of inflationnary e-folds and therefore various properties,
with an amplitude given by:
A ∝ eD
2
,
D being the linear spatial size of the Euclidean 4-
dimensionnal hemisphere where the solution nucleates
[10]. Actually, D ∝ 1/Φ0, where Φ0 is the initial value of
the massive scalar field, and N ∝ exp(Φ0), where N is
the number of e-folds of inflation. Taking the volume of
the resulting universe as a rough mesure proportional to
the number of observers, one can compare the probabil-
ity for our Universe being what it is in a single universe
history on the one hand and, on the other hand, with
the observer-weighted probability that should be chosen
in the Everett many-worlds view where all universes do
actually exist. The result strongly favors the Everett
view. Obviously the conclusion should not be taken too
seriously. Firstly, because it could very well be that
the Hartle-Hawking proposal is not correct. Secondly,
because even in this framework, the preliminary result
from Page relies on many controversial assumptions.
But this shows that testing the Everett proposal is
possible.
This approach can be generalized to basically any
model of quantum cosmology. The most delicate point
is to define the measure for the number of observers
for each outcome. This is quite straightforward in
the case of closed universes (that are anyway often
better defined in quantum cosmology) but very diffi-
cult in general. In the framework of Loop Quantum
Cosmology [11], for example, the situation is more
complicated. All quantum states can be shown to
undergo a bounce in the sense that the expectation
value of the volume operator has a non-zero lower
bound in any state. Basically, the Wheel-DeWitt equa-
tion is replaced by a difference equation : ∂2ϕΨ(ν, ϕ) =
3piG
4λ2
ν
[
(ν + 2λ)Ψ(ν + 4λ)− 2νΨ˜(ν) + (ν − 2λ)Ψ(ν − 4λ)
]
where Ψ is the wave function of the Universe and λ is
the square root of the minimum area gap. The situation
is tricky because at the semi-classical order, the duration
of inflation is here determined by the phase of the
inflaton field in the remote past, that is in the classical
contracting branch. Although the most probable value
can be determined [12], this remains a random classical
process. However, all quantum trajectories are still pos-
sible around the semi-classical approximation of highly
peaked states. One has in principle all the required
ingredients to calculate the weighted and unweighted
probabilities for different universes and compare with
ours.
Clearly, the procedure is still mostly out of reach
just because we don’t yet have an established theory of
quantum cosmology (not to mention that some physicist
even question the fact that quantum mechanics should
apply to the Universe as whole [13]) and it would be
difficult to establish this theory if the interpretation of
quantum mechanics if not fixed. The most promising
avenue would be to have empirical evidence for a given
quantum gravity proposal (e.g. by measuring Lorentz
invariance violations, by detecting quantum gravity
effects in black holes, or by any other means) and then
apply this otherwise confirmed model to the Universe.
This proposal should be taken with care. It could
probably be pushed ad absurdum. There is usually a
non-vanishing quantum probability for basically every-
thing. For example, there is a non-vanishing quantum
probability for me to survive any kind of illness or
aging process. In the Everett view, I will somehow be
”immortal”. Not for my friends and family, of course,
seing me dying in most worlds. So I might argue that
the simple fact that I am writing this article at an age
which is not much above (and actually even smaller)
that the mean life expectancy is already an argument
disfavoring the model (the probability than I am less
than 80 years-old if I am allowed to be eternal is very
small). This would however forgets that the number of
copies of myself decreases very fast as time goes on and
this might counterbalance the naive argument.
The main point we wanted to make is that testing the
Everett many-worlds is not fundamentally different from
testing any multiverse model and is in principle possible.
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